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Currency Board And Economic Development 
Dimitar Chobanov 
ound money is one of the prerequisites for 
ustainable economic development. A great 
umber of empirical studies prove that low 
nflation countries experience faster economic 
rowth than high inflation countries. What is the 
eason for this? Sound money reduces the 
ncertainty about the future price development 
nd hence it makes the choice easier. It enables 
ndividuals to realize the best allocation of 
esources and products. Apart from this, it 
llows correct comparison of prices and helps 
ecision taking. 
uring high inflation periods the quantity of 
oods and services that can be bought with 
pecific currency diminishes across the time. 
ence, the purchasing power becomes smaller 
nd persons that hold money balances actually 
ecome poorer. As a result from inflation, 
idden income redistribution happens – from 
ersons with fixed income to the rest. 
oney soundness in Bulgaria was assured 
hrough the introduction of the currency board 
rrangement (CBA) in 1997. It caused 
onsiderable reduction of inflation and calmed 
he inflationary expectations. In practice, the 
onetary sources of inflation were eliminated – 
.e. the opportunity for “printing” money 
ropped out because the issuing of Bulgarian lev 
s a result of higher money demand by the 
conomic agents and does not depend on the 
entral bank. 
hat are the consequences of this? The rates of 
nflation before 1998 were considerable and the 
verage rate is 210%, while after that they are 
.5% on annual average. Therefore, there is a 
significant stabilization in the value of lev and 
the inflation has gradually decreased (for 
example, it is 4.8% for the last three years). The 
inflationary tax rate that is a yardstick for the 
inflationary tax on holding money balances has 
also substantially fallen. For the period before 
the CBA introduction it is 57.7% and it is 6.9% 
afterwards. 
These facts are indicators only for the direct 
effects of the sound monetary policy but we can 
compare the overall economic development 
during the two periods. 
The main indicator that characterizes this 
development is the gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth. During 1990-1997 there was an 
annual average growth in GDP of about minus 
4.7%, which was accompanied by even more 
considerable drop in investment by minus 8.8% 
per annum. After 1997, GDP growth has been 
4.4% or the difference is 9.1 percentage points. 
There is also a positive change in terms of 
investment – its average growth has been 18.2%, 
which is a basis for higher economic growth. It 
is logical that the factors like privatization, 
market liberalization and other market-oriented 
reforms influence the GDP development but the 
basis for all of them was the currency board. 
The impact of the CBA could be searched in the 
fiscal sector as well because this regime imposes 
hard budget constraints on any economic agent. 
One of its main elements is the prohibition for 
lending to the government by the central bank as 
well as the restricted lender of last resort 
function to the commercial banks. Thus, 
channels for inflationary money issuance like it 
happened before 1997 are blocked. The budget 
deficit was minus 6.3% of GDP per annum – a 
sum that was covered by the Bulgarian National 
Bank (BNB). Still state-owned commercial 
banks granted many loans to loss generating 
enterprises for employment maintenance 
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purposes and, in turn, were refinanced by the 
central bank. In the current situation it is almost 
impossible and after 1997 there is an average 
budget surplus. Thus the CBA is a mean for 
efficiency enhancement as it widens the personal 
responsibility and hampers the artificial 
maintenance of ineffective resource utilization. 
Another indicator that is directly related to the 
budget deficit is the level of the government and 
guaranteed by the government debt. Here, the 
positive development is a result from the 
generally balanced budget, which suggests a 
decrease in this debt as well as the GDP growth. 
This is the explanation of the significant 
difference before and after 1997 of debt to GDP 
ratio – 168% and 65.9% respectively (during the 
last three years the average value is 48.3%). One 
should note the effect of buy-back operations of 
the external government debt that were made 
possible because of the foreign reserves 
accumulation, which is influenced by the 
currency board as well. 
The bulk of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
indicates the perception of the country as a 
potential source of revenues by the external 
companies. Stability and predictability that are 
also effect of the CBA are crucial in this 
relation. CBA has provided full capital account 
liberalization that is a prerequisite for easier 
entry and leaving the market. In terms of FDI 
the difference between the periods is also large. 
While in the first one the annual average level of 
FDI is USD 233.7 million or 3 percent of GDP 
in the second it is USD 1253.4 million and 7.4 
percent of GDP respectively. 
Hence, the benefits emerging from the CBA are 
considerable and spread over the whole 
economy. Still, one should note that maintaining 
this regime is not an easy task. 
In the current situation apprehension may arise 
provoked by the BNB policy towards credit 
growth. Recently, some measures have been 
taken for restriction of the credit expansion that 
not only have not accomplished the desired 
effect but also have even the opposite. 
According to the preliminary credits data in 
March there is a large growth exceeding the 
average levels for the last year. Thus, because of 
the attempts to restrict credits BNB forced the 
commercial banks to circumvent the regulations 
in order to have larger basis for granting loans. 
There are no reliable data yet so it cannot be said 
if this circumvention falls within the regulation 
framework or there are some kind of illegal 
operations. If commercial banks have really 
broken the rules then the bank supervision will 
punish them but we have to remember that the 
initial source of disturbances in the system is the 
central bank itself. 
The main reason for the restriction measures is 
that high credit growth may lead to a bank crisis. 
To address the problem BNB decided to slow 
down the growth to rates that are acceptable 
according to the central bank experts and do not 
threaten the system. But there has been not good 
enough communication to the public and BNB 
has not explained why the current rate is too 
high while their rate is correct. 
Another problem emerging in relation to the 
BNB’s policy is that because of the not really 
successful measures it loses the credibility in its 
capability to maintain the stability. This 
credibility is built during the last eight years and 
it is very important for the central banks all over 
the world. So, the central bank actions whatever 
they are should be directed to keeping and 
expanding this credibility. 
As a conclusion we can say that the currency 
board is one of the best things ever happened to 
the Bulgarian economy and this is the reason 
why it should be maintained until the adoption 
of the euro. 
 
Table: Indicators before and after the 
introduction of the currency board 
Indicators 1990-1997 1998-2004 
Inflation (%) 210.1 7.5 
Inflationary tax rate (%) 57.7 6.9 
GDP growth (%) -4.7 4.4 
Investment growth (%) -8.8 18.2 
Budget deficit (% of GDP) -6.3 0.2 
Government debt (% of GDP) 168 65.9 
Foreign direct investment (USD 
million) 233.7 1253.4 
Foreign direct investment (% of 
GDP) 3.0 7.4 
Source: BNB, NSI, MF, and own calculations 
. 
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The Social Security Burden is the Biggest 
Issue Before Business and Citizens 
Martin Dimitrov 
 
Paying social security charges is considered to 
be the highest issue before business and citizens.   
This hypothesis has been confirmed and 
sustained in several research projects of IME 
and other NGOs (link). However for the time 
being the social security burden has not been 
recognized as an issue of high priority and 
therefore no significant reforms have been 
planned.  The state owned ‘National Center for 
Study of Public Opinion’ revealed additional 
facts regarding the scale and the scope of the 
problem interviewing 800 working adults. 
According to this survey only 41% of employed 
in the private sector fully comply with social 
security payments, at the same time 22% declare 
to work without a contract. This actually means 
that 59% of employed in private sector at least 
partially conceal their incomes.  
 
Conclusions and effects: 
1/ IME experience shows that when respondents 
are directly asked whether they comply or not to 
tax and social payments answers might be 
misleading because people are afraid to respond. 
For this reasoning I believe that the result of 
41%, which fully pay social payments, might be 
overestimated and should be considered as upper 
threshold of compliance in the private sector.  
 
2/ So I can generally argue that the scale of non 
compliance is huge. Currently, social security 
payments are the highest “tax” (42% of the gross 
wage) and imply the chief burden in 
environment. My argument to consider social 
payments as taxes is that there is no direct link 
between the size of payment and received 
services.  
 
3/ For instance if firms pay profit tax and then 
tax on dividends (21% all together) they can 
afford paying higher net salaries and can save 
some money, which makes this option preferable 
for both employers and employees because the 
former lower their costs and the latter increase 
salaries. 
 
4/ The important issue is what would happen if 
the government decision is to cut social security 
payments to 10%? If 90% of employees decide 
to comply revenues would decrease only twice 
while the social security burden cut is four times 
(this estimation relies on data from the survey of 
the ‘National Center for Study of Public 
Opinion’). Besides, there would be strong 
positive effect on business activity that will 
increase the tax base and subsequently collected 
revenues. Environment would be inductive for 
higher economic growth and increase in 
employment. 
 
5/ There are a lot of people in Bulgaria, which 
argue that social security cuts would not lead to 
improvement in tax collection. Their main 
argument is that it is a question of mentality not 
to pay taxes. However they miss the point that 
operating in the ‘shadows’ is expensive. 
Informal firms have worse financial standing 
before the banks, which increases the interest for 
financing activities. Moreover contractors and 
clients are also obliged to perform ‘informal 
activities’, because a firm cannot issue invoices 
for ”inexistent operations”. It is generally 
expensive to conceal incomes because it requires 
payments to highly qualified accountant and 
recruitment and maintenance of fake 
documentation. An informal firm should also 
consider the risk to be penalized by tax 
authorities, which comes to be an additional 
cost.  
Informal operations influence the organizational 
structure of a firm.  Managers and employers are 
personally involved in all stages of production 
because it is difficult to control without official 
records. It hinders specialization and flexibility. 
We should also bear in mind that informal 
operations exclude firms from receiving so-
called public services like state contract 
enforcement.  
 
The above reasoning gives me grounds to argue 
that firms (or at least the majority of them) will 
be willing to pay 10% social security payments 
and to formalize their activities because that will 
be less expensive than non-compliance. 
 
The survey of the ‘National Center for Study of 
Public Opinion’ is an additional argument that 
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social security payments are the more pervasive 
and damaging burden in Bulgaria.  Therefore 
prospective measures should aim large-scale 
effects. All tailor-made shortsighted decisions 
will not be able to improve existing 
constellation.  
 
 
 
Recent Libertarian Failures in EU 
“Relationships”1 
Krassen Stanchev 
 
When speaking of failures, I mean first of all my 
own deficiency and lack of success in 
disseminating ideas I trust and/or in preventing 
bad ideas of being realized. Unfortunately, very 
often I realize that these are not only my 
failures. Before putting my thoughts black on 
white my intention was to have a relatively 
concise list of those failures. But then I realized 
that I dot have sufficient time and that two 
instances would be more than enough to 
describe a regularity. 
 
Thus, I decided to focus on two Libertarian 
campaigns. One of those – on tax harmonization 
within the Union – is over, and it seems the 
Libertarian cause is victorious. The second is the 
debate on the EU draft Constitutional treaty. It is 
not over yet, and the Libertarian “camp” looks 
doomed to loose, irrespectively the speculations 
on the referendum in France. 
 
Libertarians win the 2004 Tax Debate? 
 
After new member states formally joined the EU 
in mid-2004 and the old Europe realized that 
capital and jobs are likely to move east, a 
criticism spurred against lower tax rates in New 
Europe. We, libertarian think tanks were 
outraged and invested efforts to counteract 
Sweden and Germany government leaders’ 
views on how the Union taxes should be 
harmonized. We signed a petition, sent it to all 
Internet addresses we know, wrote articles in the 
local press, and talked the issue up on public 
gatherings. Friends from across the ocean raised 
their voices. Even OECD and Mr. Prodi (then 
head of the EU Commission) joined the choir 
and told PM Person and Chancellor Schroeder to 
calm their harmonization ardor. Not before too 
long, the chancellor seems to have changed his 
mood to the opposite and instead of seeking 
                                                 
1 A speech before the Libertarian International 
European Conference, Sofia, 2- 3 April 2005 
funny retribution (e.g. cutting Brussels 
subsidies) against freer newcomers announced 
his own plan to cautiously reduce corporate 
taxes. 
 
Were the libertarians knocking on an open door? 
Why the victory happened to be so easy? Was 
the EU Commission more freedom loving than 
the governments of key member states or there 
was (still is) another constellation that enforces 
lower tax policy? 
 
Libertarians fail preventing the adoption of EU 
Constitution? 
 
If in the tax harmonization debate the 
Libertarian efforts were both proactive and 
reactive, but the reactive element was more 
visible: libertarian thinkers had the theoretical 
argument before hand and it was relatively easy, 
with a little research and preparation, to 
formulate the messages, react to and ridicule 
Schroeder/Person nonsense. 
 
In the case of constitutional deliberations the 
argument is a little more complicated and threats 
and opportunities are not so immediately visible. 
 
But the pattern was similar; the Libertarians had 
an alternative constitutional vision for year 
many years before the Draft Constitutional 
Treaty was made public and advertised. If I am 
not mistaken, the fist Libertarian draft 
alternative to what we have now as EU 
constitutional text was ready as early as in 1993. 
And this is the famous proposal for “A Basic 
Constitutional Treaty of the European Union”, 
which was put together by the European 
Constitutional Group.2 
It was updated and made public even before the 
government draft in mid-2003. Some of the best 
Libertarian minds3 were involved in the 
                                                 
2See: European Policy Forum, London, December, 
1993 
3 Members of the Group were: Prof. Peter Bernholz 
(Basle), Prof. Charles B. Blankart (Berlin), Prof. 
Francisco Cabrillo (Madrid), Dr. Detmar Doering 
(Potsdam), Prof. Jacques Garello (Aix-en-Provence), 
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updating and virtually the entire community 
raised its voice against the product of the so-
called European Convention for the Future of 
Europe. The message was reasonable, 
straightforward and, presumably, leaving no 
doubt that the politicians’ draft should, at best, 
be send back to the drawing board. 
 
As of today, there are about 1.8-1.9 million 
publications on new EU constitution. Obviously, 
it is impossible to have a sense from all these 
publications but with a little bit of reading one 
can review the professional comments. I have 
not seen any wholly glorifying professional 
publication about the text parliaments are 
already ratifying and voters are going to 
approve/disapprove in different referenda.4 
 
Members of the abovementioned European 
Constitutional Group were also published. But 
their opinion is almost completely lost in the 
ocean of glorifying press. As far as it is possible 
to judge from a distance, reasonable opposition 
is visible in the British newspapers. EU 
sponsored Euronews TV has a completely non-
critical attitude. 
 
In the new member states, again to the extend it 
is possible to judge, their politicians, leading 
observers, press and TV compete in the 
propaganda for the Constitutional Treaty. 
Lithuanian Parliament was the first to ratify it; 
other New Europe countries, including the most 
                                                                         
Dr. Habil Lueder Gerken (Berlin), Prof. Kristian 
Kirchner (Berlin), Dr. Elena Leontieva (Vilnius), 
Prof. Angelo Petroni (Torino), Prof. Joachim 
Rueckert (Frankfurt am Main), Prof. Paskal Salin 
(Paris), Prof. Friedrich Schneider (Linz), Dr. Jiri 
Schwarz (Prague), Peter Stein (Stockholm), Prof. 
Roland Vaubel (Manheim), Frank Vibert (Lomdon), 
and Jan Winiecki (Frankfurt am Oder). 
4 I think that a referendum on such a vast and vague 
text is in itself an attempt to manipulate public 
opinion. By the way, the process of drafting and 
popular voting resembles that of Kygyzstan: very few 
could read and understand the text, opposition is out-
published and 2001 amendments gained 90% popular 
approval. The difference is that Kygyz Constitution 
(the preamble actually voted) says literary: “We, the 
people of Kyrgyzstan… recognize the priority of the 
rights of man over government institutions”. There is 
no single sentence in the EU constitution that so 
clearly defends the individual. This and similar 
statements in the Kyrgyz Constitution are just 
statements and no more than statements. There is a 
fair chance that the statements of EU constitution will 
be implemented. 
Libertarian Estonia, would follow soon. 
Libertarian in Vilnius, at some point decided not 
to comment at all on the EU Constitution.5 
 
Bulgarian Prime Minister – everybody knows 
the country is yet no member of the EU – rushed 
to sign the Draft Treaty along with heads of the 
member states. There was only one publication 
in the Bulgarian press. 
 
Is the Public Opinion Anti-Libertarian? 
 
For personal reasons, I would like to avoid firm 
answer to these entire questions. I myself 
witnessed too many failed Libertarian initiatives 
and political parties. 
Different revenue, different opinion 
The “harmonization” debate was on the direct 
taxes on corporate and individual income. It is 
more the national governments financed through 
them, not the EU international government - it 
lives from indirect taxes. “Sanctions” against 
lower direct taxed could jeopardize collection of 
all taxes. 
 
This help winning the tax debate, and this 
explains the emphasis of the Draft Constitution 
on indirect taxes. 
Stupid ideas are (sometimes) difficult to enforce 
On the other hand, no sanction on “lower tax-
rate” states could have been feasible and 
effective (if the objective was to stop enterprises 
emigrate east). Even if New Europe were to 
increase taxes the capital could move further 
east or elsewhere, to non-member countries6. 
 
On the other hand, the governments are doomed 
to collect fewer taxes due to different forces at 
work: a) electronic money and electronic 
execution of transactions, b) individualization of 
processes, influences and technologies, c) 
diminished role of taxation and state, d) 
increased mobility of factors of productions, and 
e) flexibility of skills and strategies. 
 
                                                 
5 The irony of the history is that the actual ratification 
took place at the very same day when European free 
market think tanks discussed in Vilnius Hayek’s 
views on spontaneous order. 
6 In fact members of EU are states, not people who 
form countries; people are rationally ignorant about 
the EU – and this ignorance is revealed again and 
again by public opinion polls and elections for the 
European Parliament.. 
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All these factors helped the anti-harmonization 
attitude towards taxes, but they also motivate a 
search for substitutes, by Brussels government, 
national politicians and political parties and by 
rent-seeking groups in general. The worrying 
feature of EU law enforcement is that it works. 
It is almost certain that any silly constitutional 
provision might be implemented by the courts 
and administration. The European Court of 
Justice has already found that in certain contexts 
economic goals are secondary to social goals, as 
it has happened in relation to the CASE C-50/99 
Deutsche Telekom v. Schröder. 
 
Libertarian optimism? 
There is an optimistic worldview that could stem 
from the constellation of above factors. It would 
claim that, currently, the world is at a turning 
point in the history, perhaps; that it is not well 
recognized but is fairly visible. There is a belief 
that resources for big government projects seem 
to evaporate. Also, it might be argued that states 
loose ownership rights over citizens, and their 
lives due to the decline of state run healthcare 
and pension systems across the globe. 
 
In fact, however, there are counter-currents. 
Evil-meaning individuals and groups could 
easier than destroy life. Physical and national 
security threats, real or imaginative, reinforce 
“justification” of big government. And supra-
national, like that of the European Union, 
governments substitute national representative 
establishments, transferring responsibility to the 
Unknown, to entities that individuals prefer to 
be ignorant about. 
The public rational ignorance is a key reason for 
many reasonable, not necessarily only 
Libertarian, initiatives to fail. 
 
Difficult coalitions 
If we trust Olson’s “Logic of Collective Action”, 
special interest groups are better at organizing 
than larger groups of individuals, be they tax 
payers or consumers. The smaller collective 
groups gain easier from government intervention 
since costs are borne by a larger group. 
 
One explanation of 2004 libertarian victory over 
taxes is that there was massive constellation of 
individual group interest that for decays sought 
privileges and subsidies financed ultimately 
from a rather different source, by quasi-tax and 
regulations.  
 A quid pro quo: the growth of regulations is the 
actual power 
The combined compliance costs of EU member 
state registered firm (i.e. costs of operating in 
accord with the laws and regulations), in 2002 
were Euro 540 billion (4.5-5% of GDP).7  
Detailed rules and regulations tend to spread 
more often and faster than more abstract, simple 
and experience-based ones that allow for wider 
variety of choices. The destructive impact of this 
tendency was anticipated by Hayek. 
 
Growth of EU regulations (rounded to 
thousands) 
Year Cumulative number of regulations 
1975 10,000 
1979 20,000 
1984 40,000 
1988 60,000 
1994 80,000 
2000 100,000 
2004 110,000 
Source: House of Lord 
 
There is a tendency of a steady widening of 
regulatory objectives (referring to risks for the 
public, consumers, “social dumping”) and for 
creating an over-regulation. 
 
Regulatory choices are made as a result of 
complex bargaining between interest groups and 
compromises between government strata that 
fail to meet any common sense costs benefit 
standards. 
 
Factors influencing Libertarian Failures 
 Supports or 
counteract the 
adoption of the 
Libertarian 
argument in 
the tax 
harmonization 
debate 
Supports or 
counteract the 
adoption of 
the 
Libertarian 
argument in 
the 
constitutional 
debate 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Revenue 
Supports Counteracts 
Enforcement Supports Counteracts 
Optimism Counteracts Supports 
Coalitions Counteract Counteract 
Regulation 
growth 
Counteracts Supports 
                                                 
7 See: SIGMA (OECD), Improving policy 
instruments through impact assessment, Sigma paper 
No. 31, 17 May 2001, p. 40 
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Why Bulgaria State Gazette is Not Available 
on Internet? 
Krassen Stanchev 
 
In April, the Parliament of Bulgaria adopted 
amendments to the regulations of the State 
Gazette. It is expected that public procurement 
tenders will be available on the Gazette website 
and that it would safe time and effort both for 
the government and interested suppliers. 
According to different estimates, GOB buys 
products and services that amount to 13-16 of 
GDP; in some sectors of the Bulgarian market it 
is above 50%”, said a company manager 
interviewed by us. This is the case in 
pharmaceuticals (65%) and software (50%). 
 
The new practice would not solve the publicity 
of criteria and other accountability problems of 
the public procurement. But the amendment 
allows up speculating on the issue, raised in the 
title: why not putting the entire Gazette on 
Internet if this is possible for a part of it? 
By all accounts, Bulgaria is heading towards 
formal membership in the EU. Presumably, the 
government of Bulgaria (GOB) should be 
already informing citizens on both domestic and 
EU laws and regulations. 
 
The body of law is expanding. 
 
Cumulative number of EU regulations 
Years 1975 1983 1989 1994 2000 2003 
Regulations 10,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 110,000 
Source: House of Lords 
 
But the GOB is one of the few in Europe that 
still does not provide for free access to 
normative acts that govern the country’s life and 
published in the State Gazette. 
 
Prices for electronic versions of the State 
Gazette are prohibitive: BGN 6,010. If the 
active, business and non-profit Bulgaria-
registered corporations are 300,000 (according 
to NSI criteria, i.e. those that pay taxes) and if 
they decide to subscribe they would needs to 
spend BGN 1.8 billion. (This amount would 
equal to 4.75% of GDP.) This is not happening. 
Three companies have full subscription and then 
resell the State Gazette at an average price of 
BGN 1,000. 
 
Key EU member states avoid such unnecessary 
costs.  
 
State Gazette in Selected EU Countries 
EU and 
countries 
Responsible / 
disseminating 
agency 
Internet 
access Charge 
EU General 
directorate 
Full 
access 
None 
Sweden Justice 
ministry 
Full 
access 
None 
Austria Private 
company with 
government 
participation 
Full 
access 
None 
Hungary Private 
company with 
government 
participation 
Full 
access 
None 
Czech 
Republic 
Ministry of 
interior 
Full 
access 
None 
Estonia Government 
publishing 
house  
Full 
access 
None 
Ireland Government 
agency 
Full 
access 
None 
Source: 
http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/opoce/ojf/info/data/pro
d/html/gaz1.htm  
 
In the UK, Her Majesty's Stationery Office 
(operating as part of the Cabinet Office under 
the ministerial control of the Minister for the 
Cabinet Office) publishes laws and regulations 
on Internet and, like in most if not all OECD 
countries; this publication is free of charge and 
legally binding. In other words: legislation 
published on the Internet carries the same 
official status as the printed version8. 
 
In Bulgaria the situation is just the opposite: 
only paper versions are legally binding and 
legislations is by no means available free of 
charge. This causes additional and reoccurring 
costs of paper work and bureaucracy. April 2005 
amendments to the Bulgarian State Gazette Law 
                                                 
8 In UK, this status of the Internet publication of bills 
and regulations was established in 2002. 
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(which are to be enforced on May 1) failed to 
change this constellation. 
 
Obviously, besides the obvious benefits of the 
provisional reform, it is not taking place by 
itself. The reason is simple: special interest 
groups are better at organizing than larger 
groups of individuals, be they tax 
payers,businesses or consumers; the smaller 
collective groups gain easier from government 
intervention since costs are spread and borne by 
a larger group. At the same time, the reform is 
far from trivial: it should involve all normative 
acts of central and municipal authorities and the 
so-called “unofficial section” of the State 
Gazette (corporate registration and 
announcements, public procurement offers, 
citizens status, etc.) and the functions of 
respective registries (or their pending reforms). 
On the other hand, however, all these would 
benefit from the reform. 
 
 
 
 
Invest and the State Will Protect You 
Svetla Kostadinova 
 
This Friday (April 22) the Bulgarian Parliament 
approved on second hearing the Amending Act 
to the Public Offering of Securities Act. One of 
the proposals was the creation of a Fund for 
compensation of investors in securities. The 
purpose of the Fund will be to “guarantee the 
customers’ assets of investment intermediary up 
to 40 0009 leva by client. Customers’ assets 
according to this law include cash, securities 
and other assets of the investment intermediary, 
gained by as result of its activity, including 
interest payments, dividends and other 
payments, made in relation to securities, and 
which the investment intermediary company 
should give back to its customers in accordance 
to the law and contracts”(art. 776, paragraph 1 
and 2). In order to do this, each investment 
intermediary company that holds clients’ cash 
and securities and for whom therefore can arise 
obligations, is obliged to make money payments 
to the Fund. These are affiliation and annual 
payments by the intermediaries, income from 
investing of these funds, as well as other sources 
as loans, donations and foreign aid. The control 
over the Fund is supposed to be exercised by the 
National Audit Office. 
 
What is happening? We have investors that have 
liquid capital and decide to take certain risk and 
invest. They choose investment intermediary 
company, read the company rules, agree on 
them, sign a contract and deliver the money for 
acquiring certain stock. 
 
                                                 
9 Equals to 20 452 euro. 
The establishment of such Fund can be 
interpreted as following: 
 
1. It appears that at the moment there are 
investment companies that are risky 
enough to provoke such reaction from 
the state. We have seen misleading 
advertisements of intermediaries that 
expect and/or promise unrealistically 
high returns. This obviously cannot be 
possible and therefore each investor 
assess for himself if one intermediary is 
reliable enough. The state is trying to 
intervene in area where by presumption 
the prognosis and speculations are part 
of existence. Good analysis, weighted 
risk, professionalism and publicity are 
enough to judge whether the investment 
is risky for an investor. 
2. According to the draft law, the 
guaranteed “Customers’ assets [...] 
include cash, securities and other assets 
of the investment intermediary”. It is 
getting more interesting. It appears that 
investor who ordered to his intermediary 
to buy certain stocks and they are 
written in intermediary’s liabilities (they 
include clients’ securities and liabilities 
on clients’ cash) can, in case of 
insolvency, be paid off by the Fund, up 
to 40 000 leva per investor. In regards to 
cash that is included in the definition of 
clients’ assets, the question is for this 
little time period for transforming one 
asset in another (money in securities or 
securities in money). When one 
investment company has the possibility 
to fulfill its obligations. In relation to 
securities – it sounds really disturbing 
because they are written on the name of 
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particular stockholder (he/she owns 
depositary note) who can always change 
its investment company ones he buy 
shares. 
3. Payment of affiliation and annual fee 
(0.5% by the clients’ assets for the last 
year, calculated on monthly average 
base) by all investments companies can 
lead to temporary liquidity problems. 
 
The idea for creation of such Fund is very 
similar to principle of existence of Deposit 
Insurance Fund in Bulgaria. As IME has stated 
many times, the existence of such guarantee 
distorts the incentives for involved institutions to 
do their job properly. When such “protective” 
mechanism is in place we are witnessing a 
situation when some investment companies that 
are not so successful in their activity manage to 
attract clients with more tempting returns, but 
more risky too. Thus, it is obvious that the risk 
of insolvency of such companies is greater and 
they benefit the most from such guarantee. This 
is called moral hazard. Also, there can be 
extreme cases where unscrupulous investment 
companies can do a deal with false clients that 
can lead to insolvency and therefore using 
guarantee payment from the Fund. Similar to 
IME proposal for reform of Deposit Insurance 
Fund, something alike can be made. Namely, 
insurance of investment intermediary’s activity 
by big insurance company, preferably foreign 
owned, that will review their work at least 
annually and will judge for the risk. 
 
The idea of the Government to copy one to one 
the model of the Deposit Insurance Fund is 
based on the wrong perception of incentives for 
investment and saving. Investment, opposite on 
saving, is purposeful risk taking in order to gain 
certain returns. 
 
And finally, the motives, attached to the draft 
law say that creation of such Fund is in 
accordance with EU Directive 97/9. However, 
we can assert that these changes can be 
interpreted as another example of state 
intervention in one sector that works properly 
and has witnessed no shocks until now.
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